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The possibility of using squeezed states in the recently suggested unidimensional continuous-variable quan-
tum key distribution based on a single quadrature modulation is addressed. It is shown that squeezing of the
signal states expands the physicality bounds of the effective entangled state shared between the trusted parties
due to the antisqueezing noise in the unmodulated quadrature. Modulation of the antisqueezed quadrature, on
the other hand, effectively shrinks the physicality bounds due to the squeezing in the unmodulated quadrature
and also provides noise on the reference side of the protocol, thus limiting the possibility of eavesdropping in
noisy channels. This strategy is practical for low-loss (i.e., short-distance) channels, especially if direct recon-
ciliation scheme is applied.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] is the practical ap-
plication of quantum information science, which is aimed
at the development of methods (protocols) for the distribu-
tion of secure keys such that the security of a key is pro-
vided by the laws of quantum physics. The key can be used
later in classical one-time pad cryptography, thus providing
the complete postquantum solution for secure communication
resilient against foreseen effective quantum computing. Af-
ter starting with qubit-based discrete-variable protocols (see
[2] for review) QKD was recently extended to continuous-
variable (CV) [3] protocols (see [4] for review) which are
aimed at providing higher key rates and simpler implementa-
tion compared to their discrete-variable counterparts. The first
ideas in the field of CV QKD were based on discrete modu-
lation and decoding of coherent and quadrature-squeezed [5]
states of light as well as photon-number squeezed states [6–
8], but had limited security proofs. It was an important step
in the development of CV QKD when the use of Gaussian
modulation [9] was suggested [10] for quadrature-squeezed
states [11] and later shown to be applicable for coherent states
as well [12]. It was shown that Gaussian protocols using
squeezed [10, 13–15] and coherent [12, 16–23] states are se-
cure against collective attacks and can tolerate, in principle,
any level of channel attenuation if reverse information recon-
ciliation is used [16]. In addition, a family of measurement-
device-independent CV QKD protocols was developed and
tested using coherent states of light [24, 25]. Importantly, se-
curity of CV QKD against collective attacks implies security
against general attacks in the asymptotic limit [26–28] of an
infinite number of data as well as, under certain constraints,
in the finite-size regime [29–32], when the number of data is
finite.
Security analysis of Gaussian CV QKD protocols against
collective attacks is based on the extremality of Gaussian
states [33] and subsequent optimality of Gaussian collective
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attacks [34, 35]. This enables security analysis based on the
covariance matrix formalism, which is sufficient for charac-
terization of Gaussian states, and imposes that trusted parties
perform the channel estimation and are able to derive the co-
variance matrix of an entangled state effectively shared be-
tween them [36]. In order to know the channel properties the
trusted parties perform modulation and measurement of both
the complementary quadratures and then optimally switch be-
tween channel estimation and key distribution [37]. There-
fore, both the amplitude and the phase modulators must be
employed by a trusted sender party in order to apply Gaussian
modulation of amplitude and phase quadratures. Recently a
simplified unidimensional (UD) CV QKD protocol [38] was
suggested and experimentally tested [39] on the basis of co-
herent states of light in order to provide simpler implemen-
tation potentially based on a single (e.g., phase) quadrature
modulation with no need to perform modulation in a comple-
mentary quadrature. It was shown that if the remote trusted
party is able to estimate the variance of the unmodulated
quadrature, an eavesdropper can be limited by the physical-
ity bounds on the effective entangled state shared between the
trusted parties, and security of the protocol can be accessed by
using a pessimistic assumption on the correlation between the
sender and the receiver in the unmodulated quadrature.
It was previously shown that the use of squeezed states can
make CV QKD more robust against imperfections, such as
channel noise and limited postprocessing efficiency [13–15];
moreover, squeezing, if used optimally, can potentially elim-
inate information leakage from purely attenuating channels
[40]. Moreover, the use of squeezed states in CV QKD be-
comes more and more feasible, in particular, with the develop-
ment of compact on-chip squeezers [41, 42]. Thus it is impor-
tant to verify the effect of signal-state squeezing and identify
its possible advantages in UD CV QKD.
In the current paper we generalize the result considering
the use of quadrature-squeezed signal states in UD CV QKD.
We show that the presence of antisqueezing noise makes the
protocol worse compared to its coherent-state counterpart if
the squeezed quadrature is modulated. On the other hand,
we show, surprisingly, a positive effect arising from the mod-
ulation of the noisy antisqueezed quadrature, which is con-
cerned with the fact that the unmodulated quadrature remains
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FIG. 1: Scheme of the squeezed-state UD CV QKD protocol. Alice
prepares quadrature-squeezed states using, e.g., an optical paramet-
ric oscillator, and then modulates a state by displacing it along the
modulated quadrature using the modulator M so that the modulation
variance is VM . The states travel through an untrusted, generally
phase-sensitive channel (with transmittance values ηx and ηp and ex-
cess noise values ǫx and ǫp in the x- and p-quadratures respectively)
to a remote party, Bob, who performs homodyne measurement of
the modulated quadrature. Inset: The equivalent entanglement-based
scheme using a two-mode squeezed vacuum source: mode A is mea-
sured by Alice using a homodyne detector, and mode B is squeezed
on the squeezer S and sent to a channel.
squeezed and therefore allows better tolerance of channel
noise and losses if direct information reconciliation is used.
We therefore suggest the effective UD CV QKD protocol for
short-distance channels, which benefits from the reduced fluc-
tuations of the unmodulated quadrature and the trusted excess
noise present in the modulated quadrature. Thus we fill the
gap in the analysis of UD CV QKD by studying squeezed-
state protocols as well as suggest the improvement of UD CV
QKD by using modulation of the antisqueezed quadrature,
which increases the key rate, secure distance of the protocol,
and robustness to noise of the UD CV QKD with direct recon-
ciliation, thereby contributing to solution of the major current
challenges in QKD [43]. The paper is structured as follows:
in Sec. II we consider the generalized squeezed-state UD CV
QKD protocol; in Sec. III we study the security and physical-
ity bounds in the general phase-insensitive channels; in Sec.
IV we consider the typical case of phase-insensitive Gaus-
sian channels, and we devise analytical expressions for lower
bounds on the secure key rate in the limit of strong modula-
tion and compare the performance of the protocols based on
the modulation of coherent and squeezed states; and in Sec. V
we give our Summary and Conclusions.
II. SQUEEZED-STATE BASED UNIDIMENSIONAL CV
QKD PROTOCOL
We consider the protocol based on the preparation of
quadrature-squeezed states [11] (e.g., using an optical para-
metric oscillator) and their subsequent Gaussian modulation
in one of the quadratures. The scheme is depicted in Fig. 1.
In the following with no loss of generality we assume that
the signal states are squeezed or antisqueezed in x-quadrature.
x
p
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FIG. 2: Modulation schemes for unidimensional protocols: (a) us-
ing coherent states [38], (b) using x-quadrature squeezed states and
modulation in the squeezed quadrature, and (c) using p-quadrature
squeezed states and modulation in the antisqueezed quadrature.
Therefore if the source generates pure x-quadrature-squeezed
states characterized by the quadrature values xS and pS , re-
spectively, their variances are V ar(xS) = VS < 1 and
V ar(pS) = 1/VS > 1. Alternatively, the source can gener-
ate p-quadrature-squeezed states so that V ar(xS) = VS > 1
and V ar(pS) = 1/VS < 1. The modulator then displaces x-
quadrature, therefore performing modulation of the squeezed
or antisqueezed quadrature, so that the modulated quadra-
ture of the signal state sent to the channel in the case of
x-quadrature modulation becomes xA = xS + xM , where
xM is the value of displacement, randomly picked from a
zero-centered Gaussian distribution with variance VM and so
V ar(xA) = VS + VM and pA ≡ pS since no modulation
was performed in the p-quadrature. Therefore two modu-
lation schemes are possible in the case of squeezed states:
modulation in the squeezed quadrature and modulation in the
antisqueezed quadrature. The modulation schemes are de-
picted in Fig. 2 along with the single-quadrature modulation
of coherent states [38, 39] for comparison. The states then
travel through an untrusted, generally phase-sensitive chan-
nel, which is characterized by transmittance values ηx and ηp
and excess noise values ǫx and ǫp in the x- and p-quadratures,
respectively. After the channel, the states are measured by
Bob using a homodyne detector set to measure the x- or p-
quadrature. Bob has to switch between the quadratures often
enough in order to characterize the variance in both quadra-
tures and estimate the correlation in the modulated quadra-
ture, but in the asymptotic limit the fraction of p-quadrature
measurements can be assumed to be negligible [38]. After a
sufficient number of runs of the protocol, Alice and Bob ana-
lyze the security of the protocol and perform error correction
and privacy amplification in order to distill the key using either
the direct or reverse reconciliation scheme when Alice or Bob
are, respectively, the references sides for the error correction
algorithms. In the following section we estimate the security
region of the squeezed-state UD protocol depending on the
modulation scheme and reconciliation direction and compare
it to the coherent-state-based UD CV QKD protocol.
III. SECURITY OF THE SQUEEZED-STATE UD
PROTOCOL
Let us analyze the security of the protocol against the opti-
mal Gaussian collective attacks, which, as mentioned above,
implies security against general attacks in the asymptotic
limit. To do so we follow the purification-based security anal-
ysis, where Eve is assumed to be able to purify (i.e., control)
3all the noise added in the untrusted quantum channel. Fol-
lowing the extension of the classical Csisza´r–Ko¨rner theorem
[44] to the quantummeasurements, performed by Devetak and
Winter [45], the secure key can be distilled once the trusted
parties Alice and Bob have the information advantage over
the adversary Eve. Therefore, the protocol is secure once the
lower bound on the key rate
KDR = βDRIAB − χAE ,KRR = βRRIAB − χBE (1)
is positive for direct (DR) or reverse (RR) reconciliation, i.e.
when the mutual classical information between the trusted
parties IAB exceeds the Holevo quantity [46] χAE/BE . The
latter upper bounds the information available to an eavesdrop-
per on the key bits possessed by a reference-side trusted party
respectively in the case of DR or RR. The mutual information
between the trusted parties is scaled by the postprocessing ef-
ficiency βDR/RR ∈ (0, 1), which depends on the effective-
ness of the error correction algorithms for a given signal-to-
noise ratio and is specific for a particular implementation of
the protocol and direction of post-processing. In the current
paper we aim to compare the ultimate performance of the pro-
tocols, therefore we set β = 1; effects arising from the real-
istic finite-size regime shall not change the interplay between
the protocols.
After the signal travels through the untrusted quantum
channel, the trusted parties perform the estimation of the chan-
nel parameters, publicly revealing optimized fraction of the
data [37]. A Gaussian phase-sensitive channel acts as a lin-
ear map that transforms quadratures so that the output reads
{x′, p′} = √η{x,p}{x, p}+{x, p}N+
√
(1− η{x,p}){x, p}0,
where η{x,p} are the channel transmittance values, and
{x, p}N and {x, p}0 are the excess and vacuum noise con-
tributions, respectively, with V ar({x, p}N ) = ǫ{x,p} and
V ar({x, p}0) = 1 for the x- and p-quadratures.
The classical mutual information IAB can be explicitly ob-
tained from the variances and the correlations between the
modulation data on the side of trusted sender (Alice) and mea-
surement data on the side of trusted receiver (Bob) after the
channel as IAB =
1
2 log2 VA/(VA|B , where VA = VM is the
variance of Alice’s data, VA|B = VA − C2AB/VB is the con-
ditional variance of Alice’s data, CAB =
√
ηxVM is the cor-
relation between Alice’s and Bob’s data after the channel, and
VB = ηx(VS + VM + ǫx) + 1 − ηx is the variance of Bob’s
measured data after the channel. The mutual information then
reads
IAB =
1
2
log2
[
1 +
ηxVM
1 + ηx(VS + ǫx − 1)
]
(2)
and is the same for DR and RR protocols.
The calculation of the Holevo bound in either of the rec-
onciliation scenarios is, however, more involved. In the case
of Gaussian modulation, the Holevo bound is the difference
χAE = S(E) − S(E|A) or χBE = S(E) − S(E|B) be-
tween the von Neumann entropy S(E) of the state available
to Eve for collective measurement and the von Neumann en-
tropy of Eve’s state conditioned by data on Alice’s S(E|A)
or Bob’s S(E|B), respectively, for DR and RR. In the gen-
eral case of channel noise being present it is assumed that
Eve holds purification of the channel noise [34, 35] and then
the equalities S(E) = S(AB), S(E|A) = S(B|A), and
S(E|B) = S(A|B) hold, where S(AB) is the entropy of an
initially pure state shared between the trusted parties through
the noisy channel and S(B|A), S(A|B) are entropies of this
state conditioned on the measurement results on Alice’s or
Bob’s side in the DR and RR scenarios, respectively. There-
fore, in order to assess the security of Gaussian CV QKD pro-
tocols in the case of collective attacks in noisy quantum chan-
nels, one needs to build an equivalent purification scheme,
corresponding to the state preparation on Alice’s side and state
measurement on Bob’s side. To do so for the UD squeezed-
state CV QKD protocol, we start from the covariance matrix
of a pure two-mode squeezed vacuum state with variance V ,
which purifies the Gaussian symmetrical modulation scheme
[36]. In order to comply with the UD modulation of squeezed
or antisqueezed states, we apply a squeezing operation on one
of the modes with the squeezing parameter set to − logV VS .
The resulting state is then described by the covariance matrix
γAB =

V 0
√
V VS(V 2 − 1) 0
0 V 0 −
√
V 2−1
V VS√
V VS(V 2 − 1) 0 V 2VS 0
0 −
√
V 2−1
V VS
0 1VS

 .
(3)
It is easy to see that when Alice performs homodyne de-
tection in the x-quadrature on mode A, she conditionally
prepares the signal squeezed or antisqueezed state in mode
B described by the diagonal covariance γB|xA = γB −
σAB[xγBx]
MPσAB = diag(VS , 1/VS), where γA and γB
are diagonal single-mode sub-matrices of (3) standing for
modes A and B, respectively, σAB is the off-diagonal corre-
lation submatrix of (3), the diagonal matrix x = diag(1, 0)
stands for homodyne detection in the x-quadrature, and MP
stands for the Moore-Penrose inverse of a matrix, applicable
to singular matrices. On the other hand, the state of mode
B, which is characterized by the diagonal single-mode co-
variance matrix γB = diag(V
2VS , 1/VS), corresponds to
the modulated signal squeezed or antisqueezed state in the
prepare-and-measure scheme once V =
√
1 + VM/VS , then
γB = diag(VS + VM , 1/VS), which is exactly the same
as the state of the signal mode, sent to the channel in the
prepare-and-measure scheme. Therefore, the entanglement-
based scheme, depicted in the inset in Fig. 1, is equivalent
to the prepare-and-measure scheme based on squeezed or an-
tisqueezed states with squeezed or antisqueezed variance VS
modulated with modulation variance VM = VS(V
2 − 1).
Since the p-quadrature is not modulated, the correlation
term in the unmodulated quadrature remains unknown to the
trusted parties, similarly to the the coherent-state UD CV
QKD [38]. Therefore, after the quantum channel, the covari-
ance matrix of the initially pure state, (3), shared between Al-
4ice and Bob, in terms of the modulation variance VM reads
γ′AB =

√
1 + VMVS 0
√
ηxVM (1 +
VM
VS
)
1
4 0
0
√
1 + VMVS 0 Cp√
ηxVM (1 +
VM
VS
)
1
4 0 V Bx 0
0 Cp 0 V
B
p

 ,
(4)
where CP is the unknown correlation in the p-quadrature and
V Bx = ηx(VS + VM + ǫx) + 1− ηx.
The covariance matrices of the conditioned states after the
signal propagation through the channel and after Alice’s or
Bob’s measurements in the x-quadrature read, respectively,
γ′B|xA =
[
ηx(VS + ǫx − 1) + 1 0
0 V Bp
]
(5)
and
γ′A|xB =


√
1+
VM
VS
[ηx(VS+ǫx−1)+1]
V B
x
0
0
√
1 + VMVS

 . (6)
Now the Holevo bound can be assessed in either the DR or
the RR scenario by calculating the von Neumann entropies
of state (5) or (6), respectively, and subtracting them from
the von Neumann entropy of the two-mode state, (4), which
is done using the bosonic entropic function [47] of the sym-
plectic eigenvalues of the respective covariance matrices [9]
(see [48] for details on Gaussian security analysis). The von
Neumann entropy S(AB) of the two-mode state, (4), then de-
pends on the unknown correlation parameter CP in the un-
modulated quadrature, which can, in principle, be set arbitrary
by an eavesdropping attack in the untrusted channel. Nev-
ertheless, the parameter can be bounded by the physicality
considerations. Indeed, Eve’s attack on the protocol should
preserve the physicality of the state, effectively measured by
Alice and Bob. In terms of the covariance matrix this is given
by the constraint, following from the uncertainty principle,
γ′AB + iΩ ≥ 0, (7)
where Ω is the symplectic form
Ω =
n⊕
i=1
ω , ω =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
, (8)
which imposes limitations on the possible values of Cp. The
physicality constraint in the general case can be represented
by the parabolic equation on the {V Bp , Cp} plane,
(Cp − C0)2 ≤ VM√
VS(VS + VM )
(1− ηxVSV B0 )(V Bp − V B0 )
(9)
with vertex (V B0 , C0), defined as
V B0 =
1
1 + ηx(VS + ǫx − 1) (10)
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VpB
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FIG. 3: Physicality (solid lines) and security within the physical-
ity (dotted lines, DR; dashed lines, RR) regions of the UD proto-
col. Modulation variance VM = 10, channel transmittance in x
ηx = 0.9, noise in x ǫx = 3% SNR. Plots are given for coherent-
state (VS = 1; middle, black lines), squeezed-state (VS = 0.9;
lower, red lines), and antisqueezed-state (VS = 1.1; upper, blue
lines) protocols.
and
C0 = −V
B
0
√
ηxVM(
VM
VS
+ 1
) 1
4
. (11)
The typical physicality regions are given in Fig. 3. In addition,
squeezing or antisqueezing of the signal and, respectively, an-
tisqueezing or squeezing of the unmodulated quadrature also
influence the security bounds of the protocol, given by the
conditionKDR = 0 orKRR = 0 for DR or RR, respectively.
In the general case the security can be evaluated numerically
and the typical bounds are given in Fig. 3 along the physi-
cality bounds. It is evident from the physicality bounds plot-
ted in Fig. 3, that the use of squeezed or antisqueezed states
as the signal carriers shifts the physicality region. Indeed,
if the squeezed states are used, the region is shifted towards
higher values of noise V Bp and expanded, because the anti-
squeezing noise present in the p-quadrature should result in
above-shot-noise fluctuations in the p-quadrature and allows
for a wider region of correlation term Cp values than those for
the coherent-state protocol. On the other hand, modulation
in the antisqueezed quadrature shifts the physicality region to
V Bp below shot noise, since the p-quadrature in this case is
squeezed, and allows for a narrower region of correlation term
values for given noise V Bp . In the next section we consider the
role of signal-state squeezing and antisqueezing in UD CV
QKD protocols in the typical class of phase-insensitive Gaus-
sian channels.
IV. ROLE OF SIGNAL SQUEEZING OR ANTISQUEEZING
IN SYMMETRICAL CHANNELS
In the previous section we have derived the general phys-
icality and security bounds considering generally phase-
sensitive channel, having different transmittance and excess
50.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
ϵp
-4
-3
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-1
Cp
FIG. 4: Physicality (solid lines) and security within the physicality
(dotted lines, DR; dashed lines, RR) regions of the UD protocol in
channels with symmetric transmittance ηx = ηp = 0.9 with respect
to excess noise ǫp. Modulation variance VM = 10, noise in x ǫx =
3% SNR. Plots are given for coherent-state (VS = 1; middle, black
lines), squeezed-state (VS = 0.9; lower, red lines) and antisqueezed-
state (VS = 1.1; upper, blue lines) protocols.
noise in the x- and p-quadratures. However, in practice the
quantum channels (fiber or free space) are typically inclined
to the same transmittance and the same excess noise in both
quadratures, thus being phase-insensitive (symmetric). In the
current section we focus on the role of signal state squeezing
and antisqueezing in UD CV QKD protocols over such chan-
nels.
First, we assume that the channel transmittance is symmet-
rical, ηx = ηp ≡ η; then the structure of noise measured in
the p-quadrature on Bob’s side is V Bp = η(1/VS + ǫp). In
Fig. 4 we plot physicality and security bounds in this case
similarly to the ones given in Fig. 3. This allows us to com-
pare the robustness of the UD protocols to channel noise. It is
evident from the plot that in the case of the squeezed-state pro-
tocol (lower, red lines) the security upon arbitraryCp is lost at
lower excess noise for DR (dotted lines) than for RR (dashed
lines) and, in both cases, at lower noise than for the coherent
and antisqueezed protocols. On the other hand, the coherent-
state protocol (middle, black lines) demonstrates almost the
same tolerance to channel noise for RR and DR under a given
transmittance and with the given modulation. Finally, the an-
tisqueezed protocol (upper, blue lines) demonstrates a simi-
lar tolerance to channel noise as the coherent-state protocol
for RR, but is more robust against channel noise in the case
of DR. Indeed, the antisqueezed protocol allows for weaker
noise-infusing attacks due to squeezing of the p-quadrature;
on the other hand, it is known that the DR protocol is more
robust against trusted preparation noise [48–50]. On the con-
trary, the squeezed-state UD protocol loses this advantage, al-
lowing for broader attacks within the noisy antisqueezed p-
quadrature, which is not compensated by having less noise in
the modulated (squeezed) x-quadrature.
The above given is confirmed in fully phase-insensitive
(symmetrical) channels with the same transmittance as well
as the same noise ǫx = ǫp ≡ ǫ in both quadratures. We first
plot the lower bound on the key rate, (1), for the DR and RR
squeezed-, coherent-, and antisqueezed-state protocols upon
fixed channel excess noise in Fig. 5. It can be clearly seen,
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FIG. 5: Secure key rate versus channel attenuation (on dB scale),
secure against collective attacks for the DR (left) and RR (right) pro-
tocols, for the coherent-state (solid lines), squeezed-state (VS = 0.5;
dashed lines), and antisqueezed-state (VS = 2; dotted lines) proto-
cols. Channel noise ǫ = 3% SNU, modulation variance VM = 100.
that upon RR the coherent-state protocol provides much bet-
ter robustness against channel attenuation at given noise lev-
els than the squeezed or antisqueezed protocol (therefore al-
lowing for much longer secure distance in the same fiber or
free-space channels). The weak performance of antisqueezed-
state-based CV QKD can be explained by the sensitivity of
RR protocols to the noise in the state preparation [48, 51, 52].
On the contrary, in the case of DR the antisqueezed proto-
col can tolerate more channel loss than the squeezed-state one
(demonstrating very poor results) and even outperforms the
coherent-state protocol. In a telecom fiber with attenuation
of−0.2dB/km the higher robustness of the antisqueezed DR
UD CV QKD at the considered levels of noise would result
in an almost-double increase in the maximum secure distance
(from 4.5 to 7.5 km) compared to the coherent-state protocol.
Note that the positive effect of antisqueezing noise of signal
states is observed in the noisy channels and can be seen as
the manifestation of the effect known as ”fighting noise with
noise,” when noise on the reference side of the protocol makes
it more robust against channel noise [13, 48]. In this regime,
quantum squeezing of signal states in terms of the sub-shot-
noise fluctuations may, in principle, not be needed and signal
states with above-shot-noise fluctuations in the modulated (x-
) quadrature and shot-noise and even above-shot-noise fluc-
tuations in the unmodulated (p-) quadrature can be sufficient
for improving the robustness of the DR UD CV QKD once
impure signal states are considered.
For symmetrical channels and in the limit of infinitely
strong modulation of pure squeezed states, the lower bound
on the key rate in the DR scenario can be simplified as
KDR
∣∣
VM→∞
=
= (log2 e)
[
CArcTanh
1
C
− 1]+ log2 η|1− VS |1 + η|1− VS | ,
(12)
where C ≡
√[
1 + η(1/VS − 1)
][
1 + η(VS − 1)
]
. For the
coherent-state protocol VS = 1 the expression further simpli-
fies as
K
(coh)
DR
∣∣
VM→∞
= log2 2η−
1
2
log2[η(1− η)]− log2 e, (13)
6which is lower by log2 [e] − 1 ≈ 0.44 than the asymptotic
expression for the lower bound on the key rate for the standard
coherent-state protocol upon DR, being 12 log2
η
1−η [48].
On the other hand, in the case of the RR scenario, in the
limit of infinitely strong modulation the key rate in the sym-
metrical channel reads
KRR
∣∣
VM→∞
=
=
D
2
[
log2
D + 1
2
− log2
D − 1
2
]− log2 [1 + η|1− VS |]−
− log2 e, (14)
where D ≡
√
1+η(VS−1)
ηVS
. This can be further simplified for
the coherent-state protocol, i.e., for VS = 1, as
K
(coh)
RR
∣∣
VM→∞
=
1
ln 2
[
ArcTanh(
√
η)√
η
− 1
]
, (15)
which, in the limit of low transmittance η → 0, can be
well approximated by
η log
2
e
3 , being lower by a factor of 2/3
than the similar limit for the standard coherent-state CV QKD
protocol [38].
We observe similar behavior (disadvantage of squeezing or
antisqueezing in the RR scenario and advantage of antisqueez-
ing in the DR scenario even compared to the coherent-state
protocol) if we consider the robustness to excess channel noise
at a given transmittance in the case of symmetrical channels,
as plotted in Fig. 6. Indeed, while the coherent-state pro-
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FIG. 6: Maximal tolerable channel noise ǫ versus channel attenua-
tion (on dB scale) for the protocols, secure against collective attacks
for DR (left) and RR (right), based on coherent states (solid lines),
squeezed states (VS = 0.5; dashed lines) and antisqueezed states
(VS = 2; dotted lines). Modulation variance VM = 100.
tocol is more robust against channel noise in the case of RR,
the antisqueezed protocol can tolerate larger amounts of chan-
nel excess noise once DR is used. It is evident from the plot
that the antisqueezed protocol can tolerate about 50% more
channel noise than the coherent-state UD CV QKD. There-
fore, surprisingly, modulation of a noisy antisqueezed quadra-
ture (having more noise than the standard shot-noise level of
a coherent state) can be advantageous for the UD CV QKD in
the short-range quantum channels, increasing the key rate, the
secure distance, and the tolerable channel noise of the proto-
col.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the possibility of using squeezed or
antisqueezed signal states in the unidimensional continuous-
variable quantum key distribution protocol based on the Gaus-
sian modulation of a single quadrature. The results show that
squeezing or antisqueezing of the signal affects the physical-
ity and security bounds of the protocol in the general case
of phase-insensitive channels. In the typical case of phase-
insensitive (symmetrical) channels the coherent-state proto-
col outperforms it’s squeezed- and antisqueezed-state counter-
parts once reverse reconciliation is used. On the other hand,
the antisqueezed-state protocol, based on the modulation of a
quadrature, havingmore noise than a standard shot-noise level
of a coherent state, demonstrates higher key rates and better
robustness to losses and channel excess noise than coherent-
and squeezed-state protocols. The result will be useful for the
development of secure quantum communication systems upon
short distances using a simplified single-quadrature modula-
tion scheme and compact sources of squeezed light.
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